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he recent turmoil in the U.S. residential housing market affects mainly
the market for owner-occupied housing. In this market, most owners
have less than a complete equity share in their home; rather, they
obtain a mortgage and borrow against the value of their home. There is a
presumptionthatoverthelast30yearsﬁnancialinnovationshavemadeiteasier
for households to borrow against the collateral value of their homes, thereby
increasing the demand for housing and house prices. In this article we will
arguethatstandardtheoriesoftheresidentialhousingmarketdonotpredictthat
changes in collateral constraints signiﬁcantly affect aggregate house prices.
In fact, these standard theories ﬁnd it difﬁcult to account for the observed
sustained house price increases. This suggests that we develop better theories
of the underlying demand and supply for housing before we proceed to study
the effects of ﬁnancial frictions on the housing market.
There are two components of the market for single-family housing—the
marketforexistinghomesandthemarketfornewhomes. Changesinthesetwo
markets affect the aggregate economy in different ways, and over the last 30
years these two markets have behaved very differently. Almost by deﬁnition,
the supply of existing homes in mature neighborhoods is less elastic than the
supply of new homes in new neighborhoods. After all, the location of an
existing home and the characteristics of its neighborhood cannot be easily
replicated, whereas the supply of new land on the suburban fringe is relatively
elastic, and the relative price of new homes is mainly determined by the price
of residential structures. Thus, changes in the demand for housing should
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mainly show up in the relative price of existing homes and the construction
of new homes. Indeed, existing house prices have increased substantially
relative to new house prices. At the same time increased construction of new
homes has directly contributed to gross domestic product (GDP) through its
contribution to investment in residential structures. Higher relative prices
of existing homes affect GDP only indirectly through wealth redistribution
between current owners and potential future owners.
The ability to obtain credit is affected by household income and by the
available credit arrangements. For example, if household income increases,
not only is there likely to be a demand for more housing services, but also an
increase in the rate at which households save. A higher savings rate should
enablethemtomakeadownpaymentforahouseearlierintheirlifecycle; that
is, they enter the housing market earlier in their life cycle and this increases
the demand for owner-occupied housing. Similarly, allowing households to
put down a smaller down payment on the home purchase is likely to increase
the demand for housing.
The growth of the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, has changed the market for owner-occupied housing. These
GSEs purchase mortgages that satisfy certain criteria and they issue securities
backedbythesemortgages. Theyhavethereby“commodiﬁed”mortgagesand,
in the process, have reduced the borrowing costs for homeowners. Similarly,
the growth of the market for subprime mortgages after 2000 introduced new
segments of the population to the market for owner-occupied housing. The
increasing share of subprime mortgages in overall mortgages was, to a large
extent, driven by the ability of mortgage issuers to securitize these mortgages.
The subprime mortgage market collapsed in 2007 and it is uncertain if it will
reemergeinthefutureand,ifso,whatformitmighttake. Overall,innovations
in ﬁnancial markets have affected the demand for housing in the past and they
are likely to affect that demand in the future.
InSection1, wereviewsomeofthedataonhousepricesandtheavailabil-
ityofmortgagecredittohouseholds. InSection2,wedescribeasimplemodel
of the housing market based on Davis and Heathcote (2005), where land is an
essential input to the production of houses. This model attributes endogenous
changes in the price of housing to changes in the relative scarcity of land. In
order to understand long-run trends in house prices, we study the balanced
growth path of this model and ﬁnd that the model is reasonably successful
at accounting for long-run changes in the price of new homes. In Section
3, we model the demand for mortgage-ﬁnanced housing using the Campbell
and Hercowitz (2006) representation of collateral constraints. We ﬁnd that
changes in collateral constraints hardly affect the balanced growth path of
house prices. Like most aggregate models of the housing market, the base-
line housing model treats new and existing homes as perfect substitutes even
though we have seen a marked divergence in the relative price of both typesA. Hornstein: House Prices and Collateral Constraints 3
of homes. Therefore, in Section 4 we argue that future research in housing
should develop a theory that accounts for the differences between the market
for new homes and the market for existing homes.
1. HOUSE PRICESAND FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS
The price of U.S. homes has increased signiﬁcantly since the mid-1990s, and
most of this price increase has shown up in the price of existing homes as
opposed to the price of new homes. Over the last 30 years it has also become
easier for owners to borrow against the collateral value of their home. The
2004–2006boomofsubprimemortgagelendingwasjustanotherdevelopment
that expanded the set of households that could enter the market for owner-
occupiedhomes. Onemight, therefore, arguethathousepriceshaveincreased
becauseﬁnancialinnovationsthatloweredthecostofowner-occupiedhousing
have increased the demand for housing. In this section we summarize some
of the developments in the U.S. housing market that pertain to house prices
and the ability of homeowners to borrow against the value of their home. See
theAppendix for a detailed description of the time series.
The nominal price of existing single-family homes in the United States
hasbeensteadilyincreasingsincethe1970sandthisprocessacceleratedinthe
late 1990s (see Figure 1).1 Even though the nominal price of existing homes
increased nearly tenfold from 1970 to 2007, one has to keep in mind that the
pricesofothergoodswerealsoincreasing, especiallyduringthehighinﬂation
years of the 1970s. For reasons that will become clear later, we calculate
the price of homes relative to the price of nondurable goods and services.2
Relative prices of existing homes increased less than nominal prices, but even
relative prices have almost doubled since 1970 and most of the price increase
has taken place in the years since 1995. The relative price of homes peaked
in 2006 after increasing by 50 percent in the 11 years since 1995. In contrast,
this relative price increased by only 18 percent in the 25 years prior to 1995.
One should note that even though the nominal price of existing homes never
declinedduringthistimeperiod,therelativepriceofexistinghomesdiddecline
in the early 1980s and 1990s.
The trend for the relative price of new single-family homes differs signif-
icantly from the relative price trend for existing homes. From 1970–2007, the
relative price of new homes has increased by only one-third as much as the
relative price of existing homes. Although new homes became relatively ex-
pensiveinthelate1970s,theirrelativepricethendeclineduntilthemid-1990s.
1All price indexes, for existing homes here and new homes below, are quality adjusted.
2 The price index of nondurable goods and services is constructed using personal consumption
expenditure data and excludes the service components related to housing. For a description of how
the price index is constructed, see the Appendix.4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Home Prices
















New Single-Family Home, Incl. Lot
New Single-Family Structures
Notes: Except for the series “FHFA, Nominal,” all prices are relative to a price index of
nondurable consumption goods and services. All series are annual averages, except for
2008, which represents the average for the ﬁrst three quarters. The series are described
in the Appendix.
Thepriceindexofnewsingle-familyhomesincludesthevalueofthelot; thus,
differences between the relative price of new and existing homes must be at-
tributed to differences in the value of land embodied in the house price. In the
National Income Account (NIA) measures of investment in residential struc-
tures, estimates of the value of land embodied in new single-family homes are
removed from the new house price series. As we can see from Figure 1, the
price index for single-family residential structures tracks the price index for
new single-family homes quite closely. This suggests that the relative price
of land used in the production of new homes has increased at about the same
rateashasthepriceofresidentialstructures. Finally, sincetherearepersistent
deviations of the price of new homes from the price of existing homes, we
have to conclude that these two types of housing are imperfect substitutes.
The ability of owners to borrow against the collateral value of their house
has increased over time. For example, there is some evidence that the average
down payment on the purchase of a home declined signiﬁcantly in the 1990s.A. Hornstein: House Prices and Collateral Constraints 5













































































C. Ratio of Loan Limit to Price, 1995 = 100 D. Homeowners' Equity Share












Notes: Panels A and B graph the average loan-price ratio and the distribution of loan-
price ratios for conventional loans used to purchase homes. Panel C graphs an index of
the ratio of conforming loan limits to average house prices. Panel D graphs the home-
owners’ equity share from Flow of Funds data. Panel E graphs the share of reﬁnance in
total mortgage originations, and Panel F graphs the fraction of reﬁnances that resulted
in a 5 percent increase in the outstanding loan. Detailed descriptions of the series are
provided in the Appendix.
Theloan-priceratioforconventionalmortgagesusedtopurchasesingle-family
homes increased from 75 percent to a peak of 80 percent in the mid-1990s
(Figure 2, PanelA). Furthermore, the fraction of these conventional loans that
had loan-price ratios in excess of 90 percent reached a peak of 25 percent in
the mid-1990s (Figure 2, Panel B).
For the time period considered, the majority of mortgages originated
are conforming; that is, they satisfy the underwriting guidelines of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac and they do not exceed the loan limit imposed by ei-
ther one. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase and securitize conforming6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
mortgages. Up until September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
GSEs and mortgage market participants viewed them as being (implicitly)
backed by the federal government.3 Because of the implicit guarantee for
GSE debt, the rates at which the two GSEs were able to borrow, and therefore
the interest rates on conforming mortgages, tended to be low. Under these
circumstances, homeowners can increase the loan share on which they pay
relatively low interest rates; that is, they can lower the cost of a mortgage
when the GSEs raise their loan limit relative to the average purchase price.
Figure 2, Panel C plots the ratio of the loan limit imposed by Freddie Mac
relative to the house price index for single-family homes purchased with con-
ventional mortgages.4 As we can see, the loan-limit to price ratio increased
substantially in the late 1980s, and even today it is about 15 percent higher
than in the 1980s.
Afurthersignthatﬁnancialinnovationsmadeiteasierforownerstoborrow
against the collateral value of their homes comes from the Flow of Funds data




for the purchase of homes suggests that these requirements started to increase




more than 40 percent of the total volume of mortgage originations (Figure
2, Panel E). In addition, more than 50 percent of all mortgage reﬁnances




it possible for other homeowners to reduce their equity share substantially.
It is, however, not straightforward to assess the quantitative importance of
subprime mortgages since this market is less well-deﬁned than the market for
primemortgages. Primemortgagesareessentiallyconformingmortgagesand
3 Weinberg and Walter (2002) discuss the possibility of implicit government guarantees on
GSE debt. On September 7, 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by the U.S.
government, and it would appear that the guarantee on GSE debt was made explicit. The regulator
of Fannie and Freddie, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) has, however, stated that the
guarantee is “effective,” but not “explicit” (Natarajan 2008). Mortgage investors apparently also see
a distinction between effective and explicit guarantees and, as of the end of November 2008, the
interest rate spreads of GSE debt relative to comparable Treasury debt was 1.5 percentage points,
about twice the spread before the takeover.
4 Whereas the loan limit series is in current dollars, the home price series is an index nor-
malized to 100 in 1987. Therefore, we renormalized the ratio to 100 in 1995.A. Hornstein: House Prices and Collateral Constraints 7
jumbo mortgages, that is, mortgages that exceed the loan limit imposed by
the two GSEs for borrowers with good credit histories. Subprime mortgages,
according to most deﬁnitions, involve borrowers with impaired credit histo-
ries, which is reﬂected in low credit ratings. Subprime mortgages also tend
to involve high loan-to-value ratios. Occasionally, subprime mortgages are
grouped together with Alt-A mortgages. Unlike subprime mortgages, Alt-A
mortgages are taken out by borrowers with good credit history, but the mort-
gage may involve a loan-to-value ratio that is too high or documentation that
is insufﬁcient for the mortgage to conform to the GSE standards.
Even though subprime mortgages lie at the heart of the ﬁnancial market
disruptions of the last year, they became a quantitatively important part of the
mortgage market only after 2000, long after house prices started to increase.
Mayer and Pence (2008) suggest that the share of subprime mortgages in the
total number of all originated mortgages increased from less than 10 percent
before 2000 to more than 20 percent after 2000.5 Furthermore, Mayer and
Pence (2008) argue that subprime originations were predominantly cash-out
reﬁnances. Gorton (2008) provides some statistics on the value of subprime
and Alt-A mortgages, both in originations and in total outstanding volume.
According to Gorton (2008, Table 3), the share of subprime mortgages in
the total value of originations increased from 8 percent in 2000 to about 20
percent in 2004–2006. Consequently, the share of subprime mortgages in the
totalvalueofoutstandingmortgagesincreasedfrom3percentin2000tomore
than 10 percent in 2004–2006 (Gorton 2008, Table 2).
2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF HOUSING
We describe a simple general equilibrium model of the demand for housing
where the price of housing is endogenous. A representative consumer has
preferences over the consumption of nondurable goods and housing services.
Housing services are proportional to the stock of housing. New housing is
produced by combining new residential structures, structures for short, with
land. New structures, together with nondurable consumption goods, are pro-
duced from aggregate output. The rate of transformation between nondurable
consumption goods and structures is exogenous and determines the relative
prices of structures. In this environment the relative price of housing depends
on the supply of land and the relative price of structures.
We are interested in the model’s ability to account for sustained house
price increases such as those displayed in Figure 1. We will, therefore, study
the model’s balanced growth path, which reﬂects its long-run growth rates.
5 Mayer and Pence (2008) discuss different deﬁnitions of subprime mortgages and their most
preferred measure is based on the subprime lender list maintained by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The Environment
Time is continuous and the horizon is inﬁnite. A representative agent derives
utility from the consumption of a nondurable good, c0, and the consumption
of housing services, h0. The agent’s preferences are
 ∞
0
e−ρ0t {θ lnh0 (t) + (1 − θ)lnc0 (t)}dt, (1)
withtimepreferencerateρ0 > 0and0 <θ<1. Theconsumptionofhousing
services is proportional to the stock of housing units owned by the agent. In
this article, we will use the terms “housing services” and “housing stock”
interchangeably.
The agent receives an exogenous endowment stream of an homogeneous
good. The value of the endowment in terms of the nondurable consumption
good is y0. We express all prices in terms of the nondurable consumption
good. The agent also receives l0 units of new land and the price of new land
is pl. The agent can use his income for consumption, the purchase of new
housing units, xh0, at the relative price, ph, or he can save it at an interest rate,
r. The ﬂow budget constraint of the household is
˙ a0 (t) + c0 (t) + ph (t)xh0 (t) = y0 (t) + pl (t)l0 (t) + r (t)a0 (t),( 2 )
wherea0 istheagent’snetﬁnancialwealth.6 Housingdepreciatesatrateδ>0
and the stock of housing accumulates according to
˙ h0 (t) = xh0 (t) − δh0 (t). (3)
The homogenous good, y, can be used to produce the nondurable con-
sumptiongoodoritcanbeusedtoproducestructures, xs. Therateoftransfor-
mation between nondurable consumption goods and structures is exogenous
and the relative price of structures, ps, is the inverse of the relative productiv-
ity of the structures sector. The aggregate resource constraint for nondurable
consumption and structures is
c(t) + ps (t)xs (t) = y (t).( 4 )
Structures are combined with new land to produce new housing units using a
Cobb-Douglas technology
xh (t) = xs (t)
β l (t)
1−β , (5)
with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The production of all goods is competitive.
The representative agent owns all of the endowment of land and the
homogeneous output good. Market clearing for land, the output good, the
nondurable consumption good, new housing structures, and the credit market
6 The notation ˙ z(t) = ∂z(t)/∂t denotes the time derivative of the variable, z, as a function
of time, t.A. Hornstein: House Prices and Collateral Constraints 9
imply (4), (5), and
l (t) = l0 (t), y (t) = y0 (t), c(t) = c0 (t), xh (t) = xh0 (t),0= a0 (t).
(6)
We assume that the economy is growing over time. In particular, the
endowments y and l and the relative price ps all grow at constant rates γ y, γ l,
and γ s:
y (t) =¯ yeγ yt, l (t) = ¯ leγ lt, and ps (t) =¯ pseγ st. (7)
Before we proceed, some remarks on the properties of this environment
are in order. First, new and existing housing are perfect substitutes in con-
sumption. Therefore, new homes sell at the same price as do old homes, and
this model cannot address the fact that the price of existing homes has been
increasing at a faster rate than the price of new homes. Second, there is no
meaningful distinction between renting housing or owning the housing stock.
In other words, this model can be interpreted as one of owner-occupied hous-
ing, as is done here, or it can be interpreted as a model of rental housing.7
Finally, this model entails some peculiar assumptions concerning the supply
and use of land. The supply of new land used in the production of new homes
is exogenous, and once land is embedded in new homes it depreciates at the
same rate as do structures. In other words, once the structures of a house have
depreciated, the plot cannot be reused for another house. The total stock of
land then grows at the same rate as does the stock of new land.
Optimal Consumption and Production on the
Balanced Growth Path
Hornstein (2008) provides a complete analysis of the optimization problem
of the representative agent and the representative producer of new homes. We
now summarize this analysis; we will drop the time index when not needed.
Optimal consumption of housing and nondurable consumption goods is
such that the marginal rate of substitution between the two commodities is





r + δ −ˆ ph

ph. (8)
Here the price of nondurable goods is normalized at one and the price of
housing services is equal to the user cost of housing, that is, the implicit rental
rate paid for the use of the housing stock. This rental rate is the required
return on the housing asset plus depreciation minus capital gains due to the
7Alternatively, one could assume that renting a home simply yields less utility than owning
a home. Together with assumptions on ﬁnancial frictions, this can generate a well-deﬁned demand
for rental and owner-occupied housing, e.g., Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2007).10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
changes in the capital value of the housing stock.8 The optimal allocation of
consumption over time is determined by a standard Euler equation,
r = ρ0 +ˆ c0. (9)
Competitive production of new housing implies that for the two inputs,
structures and new land, the value of an input’s marginal product is equal to




= ps and (10)




On a balanced growth path (BGP), all variables grow at constant, but
potentially different, rates. The resource constraint for the output good (4)
implies that the BGP nondurable consumption and the value of structures
grow at the same rate as does output,
ˆ c = γ s +ˆ xs = γ y. (12)
Theproductionfunctionfornewhousing,equation(5),impliesthatinvestment
in new housing grows at a rate that is a weighted average of the growth rates
of new structures and land,
ˆ xh = β ˆ xs + (1 − β)γ l. (13)
The market clearing conditions (6) imply that the representative household’s
choice variables grow at the same rates as the corresponding aggregate
variables,
ˆ c0 =ˆ y0 = γ y and ˆ xh0 =ˆ xh. (14)
The accumulation equation for the housing stock, (3), implies that the stock
of housing grows at the same rate as does investment in new housing,
ˆ h =ˆ xh and
xh
h
= ˆ h + δ. (15)
Finally, the growth rates for the price of new housing and land are determined
by the ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal input use in the production of new
housing, equations (10) and (11),
ˆ ph +ˆ xh =ˆ pl + γ l = γ s +ˆ xs = γ y. (16)
Wecannowexpressthegrowthratesforthehousingstockandtherelative
price of housing on the BGP as functions of the exogenous growth rates of
output, therelativepriceofstructures, andthesupplyofnewland. Theimpact
ofahigheroutputgrowthrateontherateatwhichrelativehousepricesincrease
is immediate. Combining expressions (13) and (15) yields the rate at which
8 The growth rate of a generic variable, z, is denoted ˆ z(t) =˙ z(t)/z(t).A. Hornstein: House Prices and Collateral Constraints 11
the housing stock changes, and combining expressions (13) and (16) yields
the rate at which the relative price of housing changes,
ˆ h = β

γ y − γ s

+ (1 − β)γ l and (17)
ˆ ph = βγs + (1 − β)

γ y − γ l

. (18)
On the one hand, a higher growth rate of aggregate output increases both the
rate of house price appreciation and the rate of housing stock accumulation.
On the other hand, if the relative price of structures increases at a faster rate,
or the rate at which new land becomes available declines, the relative price
of housing increases at a faster rate but the housing stock is accumulated at a
slower rate.
The impact of changes in the exogenous growth rates on the house price
appreciation rate depends on the share of land in the production of homes. If
land is not an input to the production of homes, that is, β = 1, then home pro-
ductionisproportionaltotheuseofstructures. Thus, housepriceappreciation
is determined by the rate at which the relative price of structures changes and
is independent of output growth and the availability of new land. Otherwise,
if new homes are in ﬁxed supply, that is, β = 0, then house price appreciation
depends on the difference between the output growth rate and the land supply
growth rate.
We normalize all variables such that they remain constant on the BGP. If
the variable z grows at the rate ˆ z on the BGP, we deﬁne its normalized value
as
˜ z(t) = z(t)e−ˆ zt. (19)
Essentially,thenormalizedvalueofavariablerepresentsthelevelofitsgrowth
path. By construction the normalized variables do not change on the BGP,
that is,
·
˜ z = 0. In Hornstein (2008) we derive the solutions for the normalized
levels of the BGP.
Quantitative Implications
What are the quantitative implications of our simple model for the rate at
which house prices change over time? In particular, can the model account
for the apparent increase of the house price appreciation rate after 1995? To
answerthisquestionweﬁrstcalibratethemodelbychoosingparametervalues
to match certain statistics of the U.S. economy for the pre-1995 period. We
thenaskifchangesinoutputgrowthratesortherateatwhichtherelativeprice
of residential structures appreciate can account for the changes in house price
appreciation rates.
We consider the U.S. economy from 1975 to 2007. For 20 years (1975–
1995),averagepercapitaGDPgrowthandaverageperhouseholdGDPgrowth
were about 1 percent-per-year (see Table 1). Since the focus of analysis12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 1 House Prices, Output, and Residential Investment: 1975–2007
1976–1995 1996–2007
Prices
OFHEO Home Price Index 0.6 3.5
New Single-Family Homes, Incl. Lot 0.4 1.4
Single-Family Residential Structures 0.1 1.4
Quantities, Per Capita
Output 1.3 1.3
Single-Family Residential Structures 4.0 2.7
Quantities, Per Household
Output 1.0 1.2
Single-Family Residential Structures 4.3 2.4
Notes: All prices are relative to the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index
for nondurable goods and services (excluding housing services), and all quantities are
nominal values deﬂated with the PCE price index for nondurable goods and services
(excluding housing services). Detailed descriptions of the series are in the Appendix.
is residential housing, normalizing output per household seems to be more
appropriate than the more standard per capita normalization and we choose
γ y = 0.01. Forthesametimeperiod,therelativepriceofresidentialstructures
ﬁrstincreasedandthendeclinedsuchthattheaverageannualappreciationrate
from 1975 to 1995 was close to zero, γ s = 0.
We calculate the housing accumulation rate based on the BGP equation
(17) and, therefore, need a value for the share of land in the production of
new homes and the rate at which new land becomes available. For new homes
sold, the Bureau of Economic Analysis assumes a land value share of about
11 percent when it constructs the residential structures price index from the
price index for new homes sold, where the latter includes the value of the
lot (Davis and Heathcote 2007, 2602). This suggests β = 0.9. For the time
period 1975–1995, this price index for new homes increased at an annual rate
of about half a percentage point (Table 1). Davis and Heathcote (2007) also
calculate an overall share of land in all home values, existing and new, that
ﬂuctuates between 30 and 45 percent. We, therefore, study the two extreme
cases, β = 0.9 and β = 0.5.
The evidence on the rate at which new land becomes available is mixed
at best. As part of their calculation of the value share of land in overall
housing, Davis and Heathcote (2007) derive constant quality quantity indexes
for residential land use. For the time period 1975–2006, their index of resi-
dential land use increases steadily at an average rate of 0.7 percent-per-year.
At the same time, the number of households increased by 1.5 percent-per-
year. Thus, according to Davis and Heathcote (2007), constant quality land
use per household declined at an average annual rate of 0.8 percent-per-year.
Overman, Puga, and Turner (2007) calculate the change in actual residentialA. Hornstein: House Prices and Collateral Constraints 13
land use in the continental United States from 1976–1992 based on satellite
survey data. They ﬁnd that actual residential land use increased at an an-
nual rate of 2.4 percent-per-year. Accounting for different population growth
and land use patterns across states, they estimate that the average land use
per household increased by about 0.7 percent-per-year during this period.
Overman, Puga, and Turner (2007) do not account for the quality of the res-
idential land used, but, for their estimate of land use to be consistent with
Davis and Heathcote’s (2007) estimate, one would have to assume that the
average quality of land declined at a rate of 1.5 percent-per-year.9 This seems
unlikely. We do not take a stand on land use and simply set the growth rate
to zero for the analysis, γ l = 0, and assume that the rate at which land has
become available has not changed over time.
Weassumeanequilibriumrealinterestrateof4percent,whichisstandard
in the literature. Equation (9) then implies the household’s time discount fac-
tor, ρ0. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (2004) reports depreciation rates
between 1.1 and 3.6 percent for one- to four-unit residential structures and
we chose a 1.5 percent depreciation rate. We determine the utility coefﬁcient
on housing services, θ, based on the share of nondurable consumption ex-
penditures on the BGP. Since we do not model the consumption of durable
goods services, it is not possible to construct a model-consistent measure of
the share of nondurable goods. We, therefore, consider two alternative mea-
sures. First, we calculate the average share of nondurable consumption goods
and services in total personal consumption expenditure plus expenditures on
residential structures.10 From 1975–1995, this expenditure share was about
80 percent and ﬂuctuated between 76 and 82 percent. This measure proba-
bly understates the expenditure share of nondurable goods since its measure
of residential structures includes multifamily units and we have included the
purchase of durable consumption goods. Alternatively, we calculate the ex-
penditure share of nondurable goods and services when total expenditures
include only housing services next to the expenditures on nondurable goods
and services. The latter share ﬂuctuates between 82 and 84 percent between
1975 and 1995. Combining the two measures, we match an 80 percent expen-
diture share for nondurable goods and obtain the utility coefﬁcient on housing
services, θ = 0.556. The parameter values are summarized in Table 2.
We ﬁnd only one noticeable change in the driving forces of house price
appreciation after 1995, namely a faster appreciation of the relative price of
residential structures. As we can see from Table 1, whereas the appreciation
rate of the relative price of residential investment increased by one percentage
9 Davis and Heathcote’s (2007) estimate for land use is quite smooth and very similar average
growth rates apply for subsamples, in particular for the time period 1976–1992.
10 We exclude housing-related services from the service component of personal consumption
expenditures.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Table 2 Model Calibration
Baseline Model
ρ0 = 0.03 θ = 0.556 δ = 0.015 β = 0.5 γy = 0.01 γs = γl = 0
With Collateral Constraints
ρ1 − ρ0 = 0.02 π = 0.175 φ = 0.0385 α = 0.3
point after 1995, there was no corresponding signiﬁcant increase of the output
growth rate, either per capita or per household.
InFigure3weplotthegrowthrateandnormalizedlevelofthehouseprice
and investment as a function of the appreciation rate of the relative price of
structures. The black lines denote this relation for the economy described in
thissection, andthegraylinesdenotetherelationfortheeconomywithcollat-
eral constraints, to be described in the next section. The solid (dashed) lines
denote the economy with a large (small) new land value share in production,
β = 0.5( β = 0.9). We can see that the higher post-1995 new house price
appreciation rate and the lower growth rate for residential structures is consis-
tent with the higher price appreciation rate for residential structures (Table 1).
Whilethechangeofthepriceappreciationratefornewhomesﬁtsqualitatively
andquantitatively,themodeldoesnotcapturethechangeofthegrowthratefor
investment in residential structures quantitatively. Even for the period before
1995, the housing accumulation rate is predicted to be less than 1 percent,
independent of the share parameter, β. This prediction is substantially below
the observed 4 percent growth rate for residential investment (Table 1).
The comparison of BGP characteristics for different rates of relative price
changes for residential investment probably overstates the model’s ability to
capture changes in the new house price appreciation rate. As we can see
from Figure 3, Panel C, a higher appreciation rate of the price for structures
not only increases the house price appreciation rate, but it also permanently
lowers the price and investment path for homes. It is, thus, quite possible
that for some time the transition to this new lower level of the BGP exerts a
negative impact on the growth rates of prices and investment in new homes.
This appears to be more of an issue when the contribution of new land to the
production of new homes is large, since the normalized levels of new house
prices and investment are more sensitive to parameter changes when the land
value parameter is large.
Finally, note that the model does not make a distinction between new and
existing homes. The model, therefore, does not capture the much faster price
appreciation rate for existing homes after 1995. We now introduce ﬁnancial
frictions into the model and ask if innovations that eliminate some of these
ﬁnancial frictions can account for changes in house price appreciation rates.A. Hornstein: House Prices and Collateral Constraints 15
Figure 3 The Impact of PriceAppreciation for Residential Structures
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Notes: Black (gray) lines refer to the model without (with) collateral constraints. Solid
(dashed) lines refer to model calibrations with a large (small) share of land in the pro-
duction of homes, β = 0.5( β = 0.1).
3. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTSAND THE DEMAND FOR
HOUSING
We modify the simple general equilibrium model of the previous section and
introduceasecondconsumerthatismoreimpatientthantheconsumerstudied
above. At the equilibrium interest rate, the impatient agent will borrow from
the patient agent. In fact, the impatient agent would like to borrow unlimited
amounts. We, therefore, imposeaborrowingconstraintontheimpatientagent
that states that total borrowings are constrained by the collateral value of the
agent’shousingstock. Westudyhowchangesinthecollateralconstraintaffect
the equilibrium relative price of housing. Henceforth, we will distinguish
between the lender, type 0 agent, and the borrower, type 1 agent.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Collateral Constraints for Housing
The borrower and lender have the same preferences with respect to the con-
sumptionofhousingservicesandnondurablegoods,(1),buttheimpatientbor-
rower discounts future utility at a higher rate than the patient lender, ρ1 >ρ 0.
The amount of credit that the borrower can obtain is limited by the collateral
value of the housing stock he owns. We assume that the required equity share
of a borrower for a home of vintage τ is
ω(τ) = 1 − (1 − π)e−(φ−δ)τ, (20)
withφ ≥ δ. Thedownpaymentrequirementforthepurchaseofnewhousingis
ω(0) = π ∈ [0,1]. The required equity share remains constant if φ = δ, and
increaseswiththeageofthevintagetooneifφ>δ .11 Thecollateralconstraint
states that the household can borrow against the value of its undepreciated
housing stock; that is, he can have negative ﬁnancial net-wealth a1, but the






e−δτxh1 (t − τ)

dτ ≤ ph (t)h1 (t) + a1 (t). (21)
Using the deﬁnition of the vintage-speciﬁc equity requirement, (20), the col-
lateral constraint simpliﬁes to
(1 − π)ph (t)q1 (t) ≥− a1 (t), (22)
where q1 represents the part of the housing stock against which the household
can borrow after a minimum down payment has been made. This collateral-
izable housing stock evolves according to
˙ q1 (t) = xh1 (t) − φq1 (t). (23)
Thus, new purchases add to the collateralizable housing stock, but their use
as collateral “depreciates” at rate φ rather than at rate δ, as does the physical
housing stock. We refer to the collateralizable housing stock as the “collateral
stock.”
Theborrowerisassumedtomaximizeutilitysubjecttoabudgetconstraint
and accumulation equation for the housing stock, analogous to equations (2)
and (3). In addition, the borrower’s choices have to satisfy the collateral
constraint, (22), and the accumulation equation for the collateral stock, (23).
Given these additional constraints, the capital value of a unit of housing stock
foraborrowerhastobeadjustedforitscontributiontothecollateralstock. The
marginal value of a unit of housing in terms of the nondurable consumption
11 When the required equity share is increasing with the age of the housing vintage, a bor-
rower would like to own only the newest vintage since he wants to borrow as much as possible
against the collateral value of his housing stock. To prevent this outcome we assume that the bor-
rower cannot continuously turn over his housing stock but has to hold on to vintages purchased








where μ1 is the marginal value of a unit of housing in utility terms, λ1 is the
marginalutilityofincome,andϕ1 isthemarginalvalueofanadditionalunitof
collateral. Analogous to the lender’s consumption of housing and nondurable
consumptiongoods, theborrower’soptimalchoiceagainequatesthemarginal













Because the housing stock not only provides direct consumption services but
also collateral services, the borrower’s effective price of a unit of the housing
stock is reduced and this lowers the user cost of housing.
We now assume that the representative borrower interacts with the repre-
sentative lender from Section 2 in a competitive equilibrium. Production of
nondurable consumption goods, structures, and new homes continues to be
determined by equations (4) and (5). We assume that the lender receives a
fraction, α, of the endowment of the output good and the remainder goes to
the borrower,
y0 (t) = αy(t) and y1 (t) = (1 − α)y (t). (26)
We also continue to assume that the lender receives all of the endowment
of new land. Market clearing for the nondurable consumption goods, new
housing, and the credit market now imply that
c(t) = c0 (t) + c1 (t), xh (t) = xh0 (t) + xh1 (t),0= a0 (t) + a1 (t). (27)
The growth rates of aggregate variables on the BGP are determined as
before by equations (17) and (18) since the aggregate resource constraints
have not changed. From the deﬁnition of market clearing, (27), it follows
that, on the BGP, consumption of nondurable goods and housing, wealth, etc.,
for borrowers and lenders grows at the same rates
ˆ ci =ˆ ai = γ y and ˆ xhi = ˆ hi =ˆ q1 = ˆ h, for i = 0,1, (28)
and we normalize all variables as described by equation (19).
The interest rate on the BGP continues to be determined by the lender’s
time discount rate and the output growth rate (Equation [9]). One can show
that on the BGP the collateral constraint is binding for the borrower since the
borrower’s marginal utility of wealth is positive and he is more impatient than
the lender. Detailed derivations are in Hornstein (2008).18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Quantitative Implications
Collateralconstraintshaveonlyalimitedimpactontheequilibriumallocations
and prices of the economy’s BGP. The ﬁrst thing to note is that collateral
constraints cannot affect the growth rates on the BGP since the growth rates
are determined by the aggregate resource constraints that are not affected
by the presence of collateral constrained agents. This means that collateral
constraintscanonlyaffectthelevelsoftheBGP.Wenowshowthattheimpact
of collateral constraints on these growth path levels is quantitatively limited.
This also means that collateral constraints are unlikely to have a great impact
on the transition to a new BGP.
Our model of collateral constraints is based on Campbell and Hercowitz
(2006)andwefollowtheirparameterizationclosely. Theimpatientborrower’s
time discount rate is set two percentage points higher than the lender’s time
discount rate, ρ1 = ρ0 + 0.02. In their analysis, Campbell and Hercowitz
(2006) take a broad view of the role of collateral constraints and they model
them as applying to the purchase not only of homes, but also of durable
goods. Our view is more narrowly focused on the home mortgage market
and we, therefore, only use their estimates of the down payment parameter
and the equity accumulation rate as it applies to home mortgages. Hercowitz
and Campbell (2006) argue that, for the time period before 1982, collateral
constraints for homes are best represented by a down payment parameter,
π = 0.23, and an equity accumulation rate, φ = 0.052. The latter reﬂects an
average term to maturity for mortgages of about 20 years.
Campbell and Hercowitz (2006) argue that post-1982 initial down pay-
ments declined by six percentage points and the average term to maturity
increased by six years. Their collateral constraint parameters for the post-
1982 period are π = 0.175 and φ = 0.0385. Campbell and Hercowitz (2006)
set the break point for changes in the collateral constraints in the mid-1980s
because they want to argue that weaker collateral reduced the aggregate la-
bor supply elasticity and thereby contributed to the “Great Moderation” in the
mid-1980s. Ourfocusisonthehousingmarketandwewanttoaccountforthe
increased rate of house price appreciation since the mid-1990s. In Section 1
wearguedthatﬁnancialinnovationsmostlikelyloosenedcollateralconstraints
further during the post-1995 period. Therefore, we study the impact of even
bigger reductions of the down payment requirement and bigger increases of
the duration to maturity than considered by Campbell and Hercowitz (2006).
Campbell and Hercowitz (2006) allocate about one-third of the output
endowment to lenders and two-thirds to borrowers, α = 0.3. Underlying
this distribution of the endowment are the assumptions that lenders own all
the capital and borrowers own all the labor in the economy. If we were to
assume that the output good is produced using capital and labor as inputs to a
constant-returns-to-scaleproductionfunctionandweweretoallowforcapital
accumulation, then the ﬁrst assumption is an equilibrium outcome since onlyA. Hornstein: House Prices and Collateral Constraints 19
Figure 4 The Impact of Collateral Constraints
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Notes: Panels A and B display the response of normalized house prices and investment
on the balanced growth path to changes in the down payment rate, π. Panels C and D
display the response of normalized house prices and investment on the balanced growth
path to changes in the equity accumulation rate, φ. Otherwise, see notes to Figure 3.
the patient lenders will own capital. If only borrowers supply labor, then their
share of the output good is the labor income share. In the U.S. economy, the
labor income share is about two thirds and the capital income share is one
third. The calibration of the housing coefﬁcient in the agents’utility functions
is not affected by the collateral constraints.
In Figure 4 we plot how normalized house prices and investment, that is,
the growth path levels, relate to the collateral constraint parameters. Gray
lines denote the economy with collateral constraints and black lines denote
the relation for the corresponding economy without collateral constraints.12
12 Obviously, house prices and investment in the economy without collateral constraints do
not respond to changes in the parameters, π and φ.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Lowering down payment requirements and the equity accumulation rate in-
creases house prices and investment, but the effects are quantitatively small.
We obtain the biggest effect on house prices and investment when the share of
land in production is largest, β = 0.5. But even in this case, either completely
eliminatingdownpaymentrequirementsorreducingequityaccumulationrates
to their lower bound does not increase house prices permanently by more than
about 7 percent.
Returning to Figure 3, we see that the presence of collateral constraints
doesnotaffectmuchtheimpactofchangesintheappreciationrateoftheprice
of structures. With or without collateral constraints, normalized house price
and investment levels decline with a faster rate of price appreciation. House
prices and investments respond a bit more in the economy with collateral
constraints, but the difference is marginal at best.
4. CONCLUSION
We have argued that models of the aggregate housing market, such as Davis
and Heathcote (2005), may be able to account for the trend of new house
prices, but these models cannot account for the differential price trends in the
market for existing homes. Furthermore, including an explicit model of the
mortgage market apparently does not improve the model’s ability to match
house price trends. One might argue that the model is too stylized for it to be
abletoaccountforsustainedincreasesinhouseprices, buttwomoreelaborate
versions of the basic framework have not been more successful.
Iacoviello and Neri (2008) use the same basic model of housing but add a
more elaborate production structure with capital accumulation, and they add
other nominal and real rigidities to the model. They are mainly interested in
the cyclical implications of collateral constraints and their simulation studies
indicate that collateral constraints may play some limited role for the cyclical
behavior of nondurable consumption. Even though their model’s production
structure is quite complicated, it shares with our baseline model the feature
that growth rates on the BGP are independent of collateral constraints.
Kiyotaki,Michaelides,andNikolov(2007)provideamoredetailedrepre-
sentation of the life-cycle aspects of housing consumption in a heterogeneous
agenteconomywithcollateralconstraints. Theyﬁndthateventhoughchanges
in collateral constraints have a signiﬁcant distributional impact in the sense
that they affect the choices between owning and renting homes, these changes
haveonlyaminorimpactonhouseprices. Kiyotaki,Michaelides,andNikolov
(2007)doﬁndthatpermanentlyhigherlaborproductivitygrowthratescansig-
niﬁcantly increase house prices, but this feature seems to be independent of
the presence of collateral constraints.
Overall, it appears that the long-run growth properties of any model that
isconsistentwithabalancedgrowthpath, inparticulartheratesofhousepriceA. Hornstein: House Prices and Collateral Constraints 21
appreciation, are likely to be determined by the basic supply and demand
structure of the housing market and not by collateral constraints. Further-
more, given the persistent differences between the prices for new and existing
homes,thesetwotypesofhousingclearlyrepresentimperfectsubstitutes. The
ﬁrst step toward improving our understanding of the housing market is then to
develop a model that distinguishes between the market for new and existing
homes. Onepossibilityistoincorporatetherecentexternality-basedtheoryof
citystructures,e.g.,Lucas(2001),intomodelsoftheaggregateeconomy. This
theory predicts land and house price gradients; that is, homes in different lo-
cations are imperfect substitutes. Conditional on a criterion that distinguishes
betweenexistingandnewhomes,onecouldworkoutthetheory’simplications
for the determinants of the relative price of existing and new homes.22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
APPENDIX
The Ofﬁce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) publishes a
house price index based on repeat sales transactions for single-family homes
that are ﬁnanced with mortgages that are conforming and conventional. The
priceindexmeasurestheaveragepricechangeinvolvedinthesaleorreﬁnanc-
ing of properties for which price data on previous transactions are available.
The repeat sales feature of the price index is supposed to purge quality change
from the measured price change. Mortgages are called conforming if they
do not exceed a loan limit and they satisfy the underwriting guidelines of the
two government sponsored agencies that purchase and securitize mortgages,
the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). Mortgages are called con-
ventional if they are neither insured nor guaranteed by the Federal Housing
Administration, theVeteransAdministration, or other federal government en-
tities. Thus, conforming mortgages are prime mortgages while conventional
mortgages can include both prime and subprime mortgages. OFHEO pub-
lishes a price index that involves actual transactions prices (purchases) and
assessments (reﬁnancing) since 1975. OFHEO also publishes a purchase-
only price index since 1991. The Haver mnemonics for the comprehensive
house price index is USHPI@USECON and for the purchase only price index
it is USPHPI@USECON. This price index used to be known as the OFHEO
house price index, but with the October 2008 merger of OFHEO into the new
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), it is now referred to as the FHFA
house price index.
We consider two other housing-related price series. First, the Census
Bureau’spriceindexfornewsingle-familyhomessold(HPDEX@USECON).
Second, the price index for single-family structures from the national income
accounts (JAFRSH1A@USNA). Whereas the ﬁrst price index includes the
value of the lot, the second price index applies only to new structures. Both
series are constant quality price indexes.
We construct a price index for nondurable consumption goods and ser-
vices, excluding housing services, from the NIA’s data on PCEs. The growth
rate of this price index is a Divisia index, that is, a weighted average of the
components’quantity index growth rates, where the weights are the nominal
expenditure shares of the components. The Haver mnemonics for the series
involved are CNA@USNA, CSA@USNA, and CSRA@USNA for the nomi-
nalseries,andCNHA@USNA,CSHA@USNA,andCSRHA@USNAforthe
chained 2000 dollar series.
The Federal Housing Finance Board publishes terms for conventional
mortgages used to purchase single-family homes. For Figure 2, PanelsA and
B, we use the annual time series for loan-to-price ratios (FCMR@USECON)A. Hornstein: House Prices and Collateral Constraints 23
andthefractionofloanswithloan-to-priceratiosabove90percent(FCMR4@
USECON). These series represent national averages of major lenders and
they include ﬁxed rate and adjustable rate mortgages, but they exclude reﬁ-
nances. The alternative measure on down payment requirements for conven-
tional mortgages in Figure 2, Panel C, is calculated as the ratio of the Fannie
Mae conventional loan limit for a ﬁrst mortgage on a single-family home
(FCL1@USECON) to the average price of a single-family home ﬁnanced
with a conventional mortgage (USCMPHP1@USECON). The latter is also a
repeat sales price index published by Freddie Mac.
From the Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds data, Balance Sheets
of Households and Nonproﬁt Organizations, Table B.100, we obtain home-
owners’equityasthemarketvalueofhouseholdrealestatelessthevalueofout-
standingmortgages. Thehomeowners’equityshare(PL15HOM5@FFUNDS)
in Figure 2, Panel D, is then the share of homeowners’ equity in the market
value of household real estate.
The Mortgage Bankers Association provides data on the composition
of mortgage originations, whether they are used for the purchase of homes
(HMTOP@USECON) or to reﬁnance an existing mortgage (HMTOR@
USECON). Figure 2, Panel E plots the value share of reﬁnance originations
and Figure 2, Panel F plots the fraction of reﬁnances that resulted in at least a
ﬁve percentage point higher loan amount (HRFHA@USECON).
For Table 1, we use the nominal value of single-family residential struc-
turesinvestment(FRSH1A@USNA)andthenominalvalueofGDP(GDPA@
USNA)foroutput. Bothseriesaredeﬂatedbytheabove-describedpriceindex
for nondurable consumption goods and services, excluding housing services.
We then calculate per capita series using the U.S. resident population 16 years
and older (POP16O@USECON) and per household series using the number
of U.S. households (POPH@USECON).
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